

## **Letter from the Crisis Director**

As-salamu alaykum, delegates!

I am Alec Hoffman, and I will be your Crisis Director for the Cabinet of Suleiman Nabulsi at ClarkMUN XIII. This background guide was a product of my passion for Jordan, so I encourage all delegates to give it a good read, and do not hesitate to reach out if you have any questions. The Middle East is often mystified by its complicated and tumultuous history, but this mystification is only to the detriment of the world. The region and its people have much to teach us about ourselves and the challenges we face today. I think you will be surprised by how the legacies of the past, even in the distant Middle East, continue to inform our circumstances today. With this in mind, delegates will be discussing events that continue to implicate the welfare of millions, and I urge you to deal with the topics maturely and with respect for the history, cultures, and people of the region.

However, enough about ClarkMUN and a little about me: I am a senior studying political science and history, and I am also the senior co-president of Clark University Model United Nations and have chaired committees at ClarkMUN XI and XII. Outside of MUN, I am the captain of Clark University's men's cross-country team and a member of the Page Union. Pursuant to my interests regarding the Middle East and refugees, I studied in Amman, Jordan last year, where I began my honors thesis in political science. I look forward to meeting everyone at ClarkMUN XIII, and I am excited to see Jordanian democracy given another chance!

Best regards,

Alec Hoffman, Crisis Director of Suleiman Nabulsi's Cabinet - ClarkMUN XIII

[alhoffman@clarku.edu](mailto:alhoffman@clarku.edu)

## **Introduction and Role of the Committee**

Democracy in the Middle East: a concept repudiated by reality and contemplated by countless statesmen, diplomats, and political scientists. Why is the Middle East so resistant to democracy? While there is not one answer, the past can help elucidate a puzzle that has confounded generations.

Enter Suleiman Nabulsi's Cabinet. It is October 1956, King Hussein of Jordan assumed the Hashemite crown in 1953, but he is still young, untested, and facing countless enemies both within and without his nascent kingdom. Arab nationalism, a belief that asserts all Arabs are of one nation and one destiny, has swept the Middle East with Gamal Abdul Nasser, the charismatic president of Egypt, at its head. The popularity of Arab nationalism in Jordan has forced King Hussein to move farther from the West, marked by his refusal to sign the British-led Baghdad Pact and dismissal of Glubb Pasha, the British commander of the Arab Legion. Importantly, King Hussein called for free parliamentary elections in October 1956. The new government, led by Suleiman al-Nabulsi and his nationalist allies, is Jordan's first democratically elected government. Faced with hostile neighbors and undemocratic foes, Nabulsi and his cabinet have a daunting task ahead of them. The 1950s is known as Jordan's liberal decade, but will the kingdom embrace democracy, or will it descend into tyranny?

"I have said this in the past and I will continue to repeat it as long as I live: Whoever tries to hurt our national unity is my enemy until the day of judgment."

- Hussein bin Talal, King of Jordan

### The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan



Map of the Middle East, 1956. Note that the West Bank is a part of Jordan and Gaza is a part of Egypt.

With World War I raging, Britain enlisted the help of Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca, and his sons: Faisal, Abdullah, and Ali (the Hashemite family), to liberate the Arab lands of the decaying Ottoman Empire in 1916. The British and Hashemite-led rebels were successful in what would later become known as the Great Arab Revolt, playing a key role in the dramatic collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, under the 1916 Syke-Picot Agreement, and unbeknownst to their Arab allies, Britain and France partitioned the Ottoman Empire between themselves. The victorious Allies would soon introduce a concept alien to the Middle East: the nation-state. Britain and France divided up the Middle East into arbitrary borders, paying no heed to the people, cultures, and religions of the countries they were making. After the 1921 Cairo Conference, the lands east of the Jordan river were divided from the Palestinian mandate, established as the Emirate of Transjordan, and put under the protectorship of the British Empire (Abu-Odeh 1999: 7). Therein,

Abdullah was installed as Transjordan's ruler to appease the Arab population, incensed after the partition of their lands and the 1917 Balfour Declaration. Transjordan, geographically isolated and possessing few natural resources, initially served only as a buffer zone and land link to more important parts of the British Empire (Salibi 1993: 87-88; Abu-Odeh 1999: 17). Yet, it would not be Transjordan's innate worth that would prove its eventual value to British interests, but rather its relation to its neighbors. Importantly, Transjordan would become intrinsically involved in the events transpiring next door in Palestine. The Arab Legion, Transjordan's British-led army, would play a particularly pivotal role in furthering British interests in Palestine and Iraq (Bradshaw 2016: 80).

By the outbreak of World War II in 1939, Abdullah had ruled Transjordan for 18 years, albeit under the yoke of the British Empire. The war itself would be of little importance to Transjordan (the Arab Legion saw some action in Iraq and Syria), but its consequences had massive implications (Robins 2019: 55-56). Britain, exhausted from the war and with traditional modes of imperialism losing relevance, finally gave independence to Transjordan through the 1946 Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. However, Transjordan's independence was only true in name. Delineated in the treaty was the assurance of "cooperation" and a "special relationship" between Britain and Transjordan. However, "cooperation" was conditioned on Transjordanian foreign policy being dictated under British terms. The treaty entailed "full and frank consultation between them [Britain and Transjordan] in all matters of foreign policy that may affect their common interests" and for neither country "to adopt in foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with this alliance or might create difficulties for the other party." In reality, common interests meant British interests, and creating difficulties meant Transjordan exercising its autonomy. The treaty also stipulated immense freedoms for the British military within

Transjordan, undermining the sovereignty of the nascent kingdom. Importantly, the British would pay the military expenditures of the Arab Legion, provided that the Legion continued to be staffed and trained by British officers such as its commander, Glubb Pasha (1946 Treaty).

Neighboring Palestine would soon become fundamentally intertwined with the newly independent kingdom. With no agreed-upon solution and lacking the resources to continue administering the mandate, Britain delegated the Palestinian question to the United Nations in 1947. The subsequent UN Resolution 181 advocated for the partition of Palestine between the Jews and Arabs (Abu-Odeh 1999: 32). In light of the partition plan and at the behest of King Abdullah and Glubb Pasha, Britain adopted the “Greater Transjordan” option, conspiring for the annexation of Arab Palestine into the Kingdom of Transjordan. Britain saw the establishment of an independent, politically unstable Palestinian state, likely to be led by the anti-British Mufti al-Husseini, as strategically undesirable. Moreover, an enlarged and unchecked Jewish state was equally disagreeable. Therefore, the British concluded that a Palestine partially controlled by their staunch ally, King Abdullah, would best align with their interests. For Abdullah, he saw the solution as a step toward his ambitions of obtaining “Greater Syria” and an enlarged Arab kingdom. After the outbreak of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Greater Transjordan was put into effect with the Arab Legion’s occupation of the West Bank and East Jerusalem in Palestine. As intended, the Legion had filled the political and security vacuum that arose after the mandate, thereby establishing a pro-British and stable regime within major parts of Palestine. (Jevon 2019: 89). Simultaneously, the Gaza Strip was occupied by Egypt and the rest of historic Palestine by the newly formed Jewish State of Israel. Yet, this conquest of Palestine would come at a cost for Jordan. In 1951, King Abdullah was assassinated by a Palestinian gunman related to the defeated Mufti al-Husseini.

Jordan has struggled to state-build since its founding due to the arbitrary and colonial nature of its founding. Indeed, at its inception, Jordan was poor, resource-scarce, and hardly governable, its mere 250,000 inhabitants were primarily tribal, and life was mostly pastoral (Abu-Odeh 1999: 13, 65). Initially, King Abdullah I leveraged the Hashemites' descent from the Prophet Muhammed and their leadership of the Arab Revolt to win over Transjordan's patriarchal society. Aided by British subsidies, the monarchy provided economic security and a basis of affiliation to the rural population through employment in parastatals, the bureaucracy, and the Arab Legion. However, after Jordan annexed the West Bank in 1950, 900,000 Palestinians would be added to the Kingdom of merely 340,000 souls. Nearly half of these 900,000 were refugees. No less, Jordan was the sole Arab country to grant its Palestinian population full citizenship and the right to vote. Although a boon for the Kingdom economically, the sudden absorption of so many Palestinians would irrevocably complicate the Jordanian state-building project (Yom 2020: 215; Nanes 2010: 166; Brand 1988: 149-50, 168). Initially, the regime attempted to unite Transjordanians and Palestinians under a single, "hybrid" identity. Commitment to the monarchy, expression of Arabism, commitment to Palestine, and the unity of the two banks and two peoples became tenets of this hybrid identity. As such, it was both a means of legitimizing the annexation of the West Bank, quelling Palestinian nationalism, and deflecting arguments that Jordan was an "alternative homeland" for the Palestinians (Abu-Odeh 1999: 279); Brand 1995: 50-52, 55; Nanes 2010: 167). Yet, the project was undermined by the state's imposition of direct rule over the West Bank, the maintenance of Transjordan/the East Bank as the "center of gravity," and the continued preference for Transjordanians in the government and military (Abu-Odeh 1999: 50-51, 59-60).

## The Middle East Since 1948



King of Jordan, Hussein bin Talal (left) and President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser (right). Source: Egypt Today.


Perhaps the most pivotal moment in the modern history of the Middle East was the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the emergence of the State of Israel. Amid their defeat, the Arab people felt a deep shame that forever transformed their political consciousnesses. To reverse this humiliation, many Arabs felt they had to throw off the vestiges of imperialism that hindered their potential as a people. Such entailed discarding the monarchs installed and the arbitrary borders drawn by Europeans, and thus to unite all the Arab people under one nation. This ideology became known as Arab nationalism or pan-Arabism. The war also created 726,000 Palestinian refugees according to the United Nations. The forced exodus of these Palestinians became known as *al-Nakba* or “the catastrophe” - a deeply traumatic event that continues to define Palestinian identity today. Most Palestinians fled to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but many sought refuge in neighboring Arab countries such as Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt. Within

their new refuges, Palestinians would play a great role in the political transformations of these host countries and the promulgation of Arab nationalism. The Palestinian question remains a major point of contention between the Arab states and Israel and is an issue that continues to rally the Arab world today. In sum, the 1950s was characterized by uncertainty and anxiety: Israel and the Arab nations alike reeling from the catastrophic effects of the war, and no permanent peace having been reached (Bickerton, Klausner 2016: 114-16, 127).

Internal upheavals within the Middle East also characterized the 1950s. Most important was the 1952 Free Officers coup which deposed King Farouk of Egypt. Soon, the charismatic Gamal Abdel Nasser assumed the presidency of Egypt and the banner of Arab nationalism. Commanding vast influence over the Arab people, Nasser aimed to remove Western influence from the Middle East and to unite all Arabs under one, self-reliant nation. Also, at this time, the United States was pursuing "containment" - a geopolitical policy to limit the spread of communism. Amid Nasser's rejection of the Baghdad Pact, an anti-communist defense pact, and his recognition of Red China, the US refused to sell arms to Egypt or continue financing the Aswan Dam, a project Nasser saw as essential to modernizing Egypt. Consequently, Nasser turned to the Soviet bloc. In 1955, he bought Soviet arms from Czechoslovakia and acquired the USSR's financial backing for the Aswan Dam. Like Jordan, Egypt had once been a part of the British Empire but had gained independence in 1922. Yet, Britain continued to administer the Suez Canal. Thus, to help finance the Aswan Dam and rally the Arab people, Nasser announced that he would nationalize the Suez Canal in July 1956, setting the stage for a crisis that would have great implications for the entire world (Robbins 2019: 93; Bickerton, Klausner 2016: 130, 136-7). Although Nasser considered Egypt non-aligned, the Cold War thus expanded to the Middle East, with Egypt playing a central role. Jordan was soon to be caught in the crosshairs.



### Jordan in the 1950s and the Cabinet of Suleiman Nabulsi



King Hussein (center), Prime Minister Suleiman al-Nabulsi (center left) and his cabinet. Source: 7iber.

After King Abdullah's untimely death, his son, King Talal, succeeded him. His accession ushered in a decade of political reform, epitomized by the adoption of a new constitution in 1952 that helped ease the tumultuous union of Jordan and the West Bank. The constitution recognized freedom of speech, press, and assembly, and expanded parliament's powers, making the prime minister and his cabinet more accountable to its authority. By all accounts, King Talal wanted to be a constitutional monarch in a liberal democracy. Yet, his reign would be short-lived. In 1953, the royal court forced King Talal to abdicate in favor of his eldest son, Hussein, due to frequent and violent outbursts from his schizophrenia (Abu-Odeh 1999: 61; Robbins 2019: 84-85). King Hussein was only 16 upon assuming the throne. His first years as monarch were characterized by his youth, inexperience, and a drive to assert himself in an internal and regional political context poised against the young king.

The end of Britain's informal empire in Jordan began with the burgeoning popularity of Arab nationalism across the Middle East in the 1950s. Public opinion across Jordan rapidly changed but military officers, in particular, began to see British command of the Arab Legion as anachronistic and an affront to their national pride. Meanwhile, the Hashemite monarchy became increasingly perceived by its Arab neighbors as a stooge of Western imperialism and an enemy of the Arab people (Salibi 1993: 179-80). With this came a popular desire for the kingdom to assert its sovereignty and neutrality amid the Cold War, a desire that King Hussein began to acquiesce to (Salibi 1993: 191). King Hussein was a very different man from his grandfather, King Abdullah, and recognized that Britain's collapse in the Middle East was not a matter of if but when. Moreover, King Hussein was more in tune with the Arab street and his people's wishes. He was not imbued with the same sentimentality his grandfather held for Glubb Pasha and was, therefore, less likely to bend to Britain's influence (Abu-Odeh 1999: 76). Thus, amid an Egyptian propaganda campaign and a desire for Jordan to redeem its credibility as an Arab nation, the kingdom would refuse to adhere to the Baghdad Pact in 1955. King Hussein also dismissed the anachronistic Glubb Pasha from the Arab Legion (soon renamed the Arab Army) in March 1956, beginning the process of Arabizing the military. However, by October 1956, Jordan still found itself subject to the extraterritorial Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and dependent on British subsidies (Abu-Odeh 1999: 63; Robbins 2019: 97). Jordan had yet to realize its true independence. Yet, will severing British ties win over the Arab world or only serve to remove Jordan's most strategically valuable ally?

As King Hussein saw his popularity soar amid the dismissal of Glubb Pasha and the subsequent Arabization of the military, he dissolved the lower house of parliament and called for general elections on October 21, 1956. Hussein, perhaps naively, thought that his newfound

political capital would deliver a democratically elected but loyal parliament that would buttress his popularity further. However, he could not have anticipated the surge in Arab nationalism amid Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal.

Jordanians and Palestinians, especially in urban areas and the West Bank, voted overwhelmingly for candidates aligned with Nasser in the election. Subsequently, opposition parties secured twenty-two seats out of a forty-seat majority in parliament. The largest opposition party, the poorly named National Socialist Party (NSP), and several leftist and Islamist parties, formed a government led by prime minister Suleiman Nabulsi. The parties within the government adhered to wildly different ideologies: Arab nationalism, Ba'athism, communism, and Islamism, but they were all united by a desire to oppose Israel, abrogate the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, and forge closer ties with Egypt. However, their heterogeneity meant the government lacked clear policy objectives. Many supported the monarchy while others called for its abolishment, much to the chagrin of King Hussein and his inner circle. Although, the prime minister, Suleiman Nabulsi, was moderate and known for his intellectualism and ability to compromise (Robbins 2019: 99-100; Abu-Odeh 1999: 77; Tal 2002: 40). Thus, King Hussein, ready to embellish his Arab nationalist bona fides, appeared ready to work with Nabulsi's new government, but with a crisis looming in Egypt and nationalist agitation within the military, will this tenuous alliance crumble? Committee will start on October 21, 1956, as Nabulsi and his newly selected cabinet enter some of the most important months in Jordan's political history. How will you ensure democracy survives while maintaining peace with the politically ambiguous King Hussein, radical military establishment, and zealous neighbors at your borders?

## Crisis 101

Suleiman Nabulsi's Cabinet shall take place in the format of a crisis committee. This may be familiar to some of you but to others, it may not, for crisis differs greatly from GA and ECOSOC committees. However, delegates that are new to crisis may be surprised to find many similarities and parallels as well. This section shall go more into detail about what is a crisis committee and subsequently, how to be an effective crisis delegate.

Crisis committees are single delegate events with 10-25 participants centered around a particular inflection point and the characters surrounding it. Whereas GA is an exercise in crafting thoughtful policy built to last and fix the world's problems, crisis is an exercise on short-term personal enrichment built off public scandals and secret agreements. Each delegate aims to assert their character's viewpoint and end the conference having amassed the most social, political, or economic power through both their out-room crisis arcs and in-room performance. This is some crisis "terminology" that will be important to remember coming into committee:

- Crisis Arc: your personal storyline
- Crisis Note: Handwritten letters (same format as an email) to a specific individual designed to move your arc forward. Responses will be written from whoever the note was addressed to.
- Crisis Update: When the Crisis Director comes into committee and gives an update on what is happening in regards to peoples arcs as well as bringing news of a problem that must be solved by the committee in a limited time frame
- Directive: Short term policy proposals drafted in response to a crisis or to carry out the overall objective of the committee
- Crisis Director (CD): The individual who determines what happens out of room and crisis

updates

- Crisis Staffer: An individual working under the CD that collects, distributes, and responds to notes
- In Room: Refers to what is happening in the committee room (speeches, directives, etc)
- Out of Room: Refers to what is happening to/in everyone's arcs

A good crisis note should acknowledge the significance of the person the note is being written to and align yourself with this person and establish a shared goal. Moreover, the note should request a specific action on their part to advance a clear agenda - one that is mutually beneficial or provides compensation of some sort as an incentive, provides explicit instructions, and importantly, is plausible. Finally, reiterate how great it will be when the action is completed and provide a logical foundation for the action to occur in your note. In short, a good crisis note answers the Who, What, Where, When, How, and Why?

- WHO: Who are you reaching out to? Who are you asking them to contact / mobilize?
- WHAT: What do you want them to do for you? What do you want them to ask for?
- WHERE: Where is the recipient in question located? Do any special considerations need to be taken to get there?
- WHEN: When shall the action be taken? Why then? How might timing affect the action?
- HOW: How will the action be taken (be detailed - outline a step-by-step plan)?
- WHY: Why is the action being taken? Why should it be carried out in the way you are asking? Why are you asking them specifically to do this? Why should they help you?

### **Questions for Discussion**

1. Jordan's neighbors are stronger than the kingdom and looking for more land. Will you maintain your sovereignty or join the pan-Arabist movement of Nasser?
2. Jordan is still subject to the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty. Will you follow the wishes of your people and abrogate the treaty, or maintain a strategic but unequal relationship with the United Kingdom? If you decide on the former, how will you replace the British foreign aid that Jordan depends on?
3. Jordan is still at war with Israel. Will you respect the desires of your Palestinian people and the Arab states and continue this belligerency or seek an unpopular but possibly pragmatic peace?
4. The influx of Palestinian refugees in 1948 has thrown Jordan's political, social, and economic climate into flux. How will you integrate these refugees into Jordan and ensure their welfare and place as equal citizens within the kingdom?
5. King Hussein tolerates your new cabinet and democracy but could easily change his mind if he feels his position threatened. How will you maintain this tenuous alliance with the young king and ensure Jordan's transition into a constitutional monarchy?
6. The military is dangerously split between Bedouin units loyal to King Hussein and a cadre of officers committed to Arab nationalism, the so-called "Free Officers." How will you reconcile this rift and ensure that the military does not threaten the kingdom's peace, stability, and democracy?
7. The Cold War has finally reached the Middle East, with the United States and the Soviet Union competing for influence within the region. Will Jordan take a side, maintain neutrality, or play the sides off each other?

### **Character List**

Delegates shall represent the following characters. I have provided a very brief description of each character, however, I encourage all delegates to do independent research. About half of the characters in this list were not members of the Cabinet of Suleiman Nabulsi. Yet, all delegates will assume the role thereof for this committee, regardless of their character's actual affiliation at this time. A few characters have very little information about them, so feel free to be creative in forging their background yourself through your in-room personality and backroom crisis notes. Do your best to embody what you think they would do in real life - but put a creative spin on it!

#### **Abdul-Halim al-Nimir, Minister of Interior and Minister of Defense**

Abdul Halim Al-Nimr was a Jordanian politician from Al-Salt. Although he was previously a staunch supporter of King Abdullah I and the monarchy, he joined the NSP and won a seat in the 1950 parliamentary election. Afterwards, he held several important positions in the Jordanian government, and later became the Minister of Interior and Minister of Defense within the cabinet of Suleiman al-Nabulsi.

#### **Anwar Khatib, Minister of Public Works**

Anwar Khatib was born in Hebron in 1917 and studied social science at the Arab College in Jerusalem. After working as a teacher in Beersheba and Jerusalem, he became a member of Mufti al-Husseini's Arab Higher Committee (the principal political organ of Palestinian Arabs under the British Mandate). After a period of exile, he returned to Palestine in 1945 and was appointed secretary-general of the Waqf Administration in Jerusalem and served as mayor of Jerusalem between 1949-1950. In 1951, he was elected as a member of the Jordanian parliament and later became Minister of Public Works in Suleiman Nabulsi's cabinet.

#### **Shafiq Irsheidat, Minister of Justice and Minister of Education**

Shafiq Irsheidat was a Jordanian politician, professor, writer, lawyer, and journalist from Irbid. He became well-known for his opposition to the Balfour Declaration, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and later, the Baghdad Pact and was imprisoned several times for his advocacy. Irsheidat was a member of the House of Representatives and Senate and received several cabinet positions, including the Minister of Justice and Communications in the government of Fawzi al-Mulki. He was the founder of the Arab Lawyers Union in 1944, and in 1950, he helped found the NSP with Suleiman Al-Nabulsi.

#### **Na'eem Abdel Hadi, Minister of Economy**

A Palestinian from Nablus, Na'eem Abdel Hadi was a member of the cabinet of Prime Minister Sa'id al-Mufti where he was a staunch opponent of the Baghdad Pact. Afterwards, he joined the NSP and became Minister of Economy in Suleiman Nabulsi's cabinet.

#### **Saleh Muasher, Minister of Health**

Sam'an Daoud was a member of the NSP who was selected as Minister of Health in Suleiman Nabulsi's cabinet.

#### **Salah Toukan, Minister of Finance**

Salah Toukan was a member of the NSP who was selected as Minister of Finance in Suleiman Nabulsi's cabinet.

#### **Abdullah Rimawi, Minister of Foreign Affairs**

Rimawi was born in 1920 in the town of Beit Rima, near Ramallah, during the period of British Mandatory rule in Palestine. In 1945, the Arab Higher Committee (the principal political organ of Palestinian Arabs under the British Mandate) was re-established, and Rimawi was appointed head of its Public Instruction Department. He was a vocal opponent of the UN's Palestine



Partition Plan devised in 1947, which proposed the division of Palestine into two separate Arab and Jewish states. Rimawi initiated his political career in 1950 when he was elected to the Jordanian parliament as an independent representative of the District of Ramallah. In 1952, Abdullah Rimawi became the secretary-general of the Ba'ath Party in Jordan. A staunch pan-Arabist, Rimawi became one of the most vocal opponents of the Hashemite ruling family in Jordan and favored union with Syria.

#### **Abdul Qader Al-Salih, Minister of Agriculture**

A member of the National Front, a branch of the Jordanian Communist Party, Abdul Qader Al-Salh was elected to parliament in 1954 as the representative for Nablus in the West Bank.

#### **Sam'an Daoud, Minister of Construction**

Sam'an Daoud was an independent representative who was selected as Minister of Construction in Suleiman Nabulsi's cabinet.

#### **Saleh Majali, Minister of Transportation**

Saleh Majali was an independent representative who was selected as Minister of Transportation in Suleiman Nabulsi's cabinet.

#### **Ali Abu Nuwar, Chief of Staff**

Ali Abu Nuwar was a Jordanian army officer who participated in the 1948 Arab–Israeli War as an artillery officer in the Arab Legion, but his vocal opposition to British influence in Jordan led to his virtual exile to Paris as military attaché in 1952. There, he forged close ties with Jordanian crown prince Hussein, who promoted Abu Nuwar after his accession to the throne. Abu Nuwar's enmity with Glubb Pasha, the Arab Legion's powerful British chief of staff, his insistence on establishing Arab command over the army, and his influence with Hussein led the latter to

dismiss Glubb Pasha and appoint Abu Nuwar in his place. However, Abu Nuwar's ardent support for the pan-Arabist policies of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser has disturbed many in the royal court and has caused tension between the loyal Bedouin and Arab nationalist units in the Arab Legion.

### **Zein al-Sharaf bint Jamil, Queen-Consort**

Zein al-Sharaf bint Jamil was the Queen-Consort of Jordan and the mother of King Hussein. Queen Zein played a major role in the political development of the Jordanian Kingdom in the early 1950s by supporting efforts in charitable works and women's rights. She took part in writing the 1952 constitution that gave certain rights to women and enhanced the social development of the country. She also created the first women's union of Jordan in 1944 and was instrumental in establishing the women's branch of the Jordan National Red Crescent Society in 1948. Queen Zein filled a constitutional vacuum after the assassination of the late King Abdullah I in 1951. The Queen again performed this role during the period between August 1952, when her son, King Hussein, was proclaimed monarch, and May 1953, when he assumed constitutional duties at the age of eighteen. Queen Zein was known to have a profound influence over the young King Hussein.

### **Fawzi Mulki, Former Prime Minister**

In 1934, Mulki was employed at the Ministry of Education, and from 1940 to 1947, he was Deputy Food controller. Afterward, he became Jordan's Ambassador to Egypt in 1947. During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Mulki was Minister of Defense in the cabinet of Tawfik Abu al-Huda, and in 1951, he became Jordan's ambassador to France. From November 1951 to 1953, Mulki was the ambassador to the United Kingdom, where he befriended Hussein, who was studying

there. In 1953, King Hussein appointed al-Mulki as the 10th Prime Minister of Jordan, but he was dismissed in 1954 after his liberal policies caused riots throughout the country.

### **Salah Abu Zaid, King Hussein's Right Hand Man**

Salah Abu Zaid was born in Irbid and related through marriage to the al-Tal family. He was plucked from obscurity by chance and became influential in decision making by virtue of his close friendship with King Hussein. A colorful figure, Abu Zaid was reputed to have arranged relationships between Hussein and various women. He was known in Jordan as gadahat al-malik, or 'the king's lighter', because whenever Hussein wanted a cigarette, Abu Zaid was supposedly there to light it for him. A fervent anti-Nasserite, he found common cause with Wasfi al-Tal (Tal 2002: 131).

### **Ibrahim Hashim, Former Prime Minister**

Born in Nablus, Palestine in 1884, Ibrahim Hashim served in the Ottoman civil service before joining King Abdullah's government in the early 1920s. As a West Bank notable, Hashim had no real base in Transjordan and was empowered through his affiliation with the Hashemite state. A holder of the MBE – an award which did little to endear him to anti-British opposition groups – Hashim was the quintessential 'king's man' who became a perennial caretaker prime minister in charge of various interim governments (Tal 2002: 132).

### **Amer Khammash, Aide-de-camp**

Amer Khammash hailed from al-Salt, although he had familial links in Palestine. After being commissioned as an officer in the Arab Legion in 1944, he qualified as Jordan's first Arab pilot in 1949. After serving as an aerial observation officer and battery commander, Khammash was

aide-de-camp to various prime ministers between 1953 and 1956. Khammash gradually became regarded as the military's chief theoretician and planner (Tal 2002: 132).

### **Wasfi al-Tal, Politician and Veteran**

Wasfi al-Tal was born in 1920 to the noted Transjordanian poet and political activist, Mustafa Wahabi al-Tal, and a Kurdish mother. Reared in Irbid, al-Tal was educated at the American University of Beirut, where he was active in the Arab nationalist movement. From 1942 to 1945, he served as a captain in the British army. From 1945 to 1947, he served in the Arab Office in Jerusalem. During the 1948 Palestine War, al-Tal served in the Army of Salvation and suffered wounds in battle. In 1948, he joined the Jordanian civil service (Tal 2002: 135).

### **Sharif Nasser bin Jamil, King Hussein's Uncle**

Sharif Nasser, Hussein's maternal uncle, exercised a major influence on Jordanian security policy throughout the 1950. A man of prodigious strength and impressive stature, Sharif Nasser was both feared and respected by his rivals. Sharif believed in maintaining a strong policymaking role for the army and was responsible for many of the purges that occurred in the armed forces. Allied to Habis al-Majali and other officers of tribal origin, Sharif Nasser often advocated a proactive national security policy which involved Jordan seizing the political initiative in regional politics. Sharif Nasser also had a dark side, being involved in a clandestine but lucrative hashish smuggling operation within Jordan (Tal 200: 131).

### **Lester D. Mallory, US Ambassador to Jordan**

Mallory began working for the United States federal government in 1931, initially for the Department of Agriculture as assistant agricultural commissioner in Marseille. In 1939 he was assigned to Paris as the agricultural attaché. In September 1939 he was reassigned as the first US

agricultural attaché in Mexico City amid the outbreak of World War II. At that time, he was commissioned as a Foreign Service Officer in the Department of State. Mallory subsequently served in liberated Paris, from December 1944 until mid-1945. He then returned to the US, where he was the liaison officer between the USDA's Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations and the State Department. Mallory was then assigned to Havana as the deputy chief of mission in 1947 and Buenos Aires in 1949. Afterward, Mallory served as Ambassador to Jordan.

### **Sir Alec Kirkbride, Ambassador of the United Kingdom to Jordan**

Kirkbride was born in Mansfield, England and grew up in Egypt. He began his military career as an officer in the army of General Allenby from 1916 to 1921. In 1920, after the Battle of Maysalun and the fall of Faisal's government of Syria left Transjordan with no central authority, he was dispatched by the British government to Transjordan to help maintain order during this interim. He established the ephemeral "National Government of Moab" in Kerak with himself as president, which lasted until Abdullah took control of Transjordan. From 1922 to 1927 and from 1937 to 1939, he was governor of Acre and of the district of Galilee in Palestine. He was Deputy Resident in Transjordan from 1927 to 1937 and Resident from 1939 to 1946 and was one of Abdullah's leading British advisors. In 1946, Kirkbride was then appointed ambassador of the UK to Jordan and played an important diplomatic role during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war.

### **Ismail Fahmy, Representative of Egypt to Jordan**

Ismail Fahmy was an Egyptian diplomat and politician. Fahmy joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1946. He served as a diplomat, serving as a part of Egypt's delegation to the United Nations in 1949. He was known as an activist and a tough negotiator.

**Farid Zeineddine, Representative of Syria to Jordan**

Farid Zeineddine was a Syrian diplomat. The Zeineddine family belonged to the Druze religious community, but Zeineddine officially converted to Sunni Islam, so he had a better chance at upward mobility in the government. In 1937, he entered the foreign service, where he headed the Political Department until 1938. Zeineddine became a supporter of Shukri al-Quwatli, who became President of Syria in 1943. From April 25, 1945, to June 26, 1945, Zeineddine was a member of the Syrian delegation at the San Francisco Conference and helped negotiate the withdrawal of French troops from Syria. Upon Syrian independence in 1946, Zeineddine became Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from 1947 to 1951, he was ambassador to Russia. From 1951 to 1953, Zeineddine represented Syria at the UN Headquarters in New York. In 1952, he began representing Syria in Washington D.C.

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