



ClarkMUN XVI

The One Piece! The One Piece is in Nepal! The 2025 Nepali Revolution



**NEPAL IS BURNING
EXPLAINED**

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Letter from the Crisis Director:

Dear Delegates,

My name is Aden Sabin-White and I am delighted to be your Crisis Director for this committee! I am a Sophomore here at Clark studying Psychology and Philosophy. I joined MUN at Clark the second semester of last year without any prior experience and have since been to 5 conferences competing in GA, Crisis, and Spec committees with the travel team and I was elected to Chief of Operations in May, 2025. I am more than happy to take any questions you guys may have about collegiate MUN should you have any!

As for this committee, I want to be very clear about what I expect out of your backroom. This committee shall encompass the events of the 2025 Nepali uprising against the current government of Nepal. This topic is recent, of course, so I expect you all to treat it with respect and sincerity but I do expect creativity and a willingness to escape historical reality. After all, a main theme of the protests was *One Piece* symbology, so take some creative approaches. Frankly, I do not mind absurdity or completely fantastical elements, so long as they are well researched and well executed.

Cheers,

Aden Sabin-White, Crisis Director

MUN at Clark Chief of Operations

Email: asabinwhite@clarku.edu



Equity Statement

Model United Nations at Clark University strives to create an inclusive environment for delegates and observers alike. Insensitive, discriminatory, and inequitable behavior shall not be tolerated. If at any point in committee, the behavior of chairs or delegates offends or disturbs you, you are encouraged to report such instances to conference staff and proper investigative and reparative practices shall be taken.

The topic of this committee is very recent and personally impacts millions of Nepali citizens in the present day. While creativity is encouraged, at no point shall behavior that diminishes, offends, condescends, abuses, or ridicules the lived experiences of those involved be tolerated and delegates shall face repercussions including, but not limited to: faculty advisor disciplinary procedures, remedial measures from chairs and staff, and/or disqualification.

Introduction:

The events of the 2025 Nepali Uprising occurred in a tight timeframe between September 8, 2025 (start of protests in Kathmandu) and September 12, 2025 (appointment of ex Chief Justice Sushila Karki as interim Prime Minister). The inciting cause of the uprising was a recent social media ban that took effect on September 4, 2025, but unrest had been brewing for decades as the people of Nepal criticized the current government for repressing their political and social freedoms all while living lavishly. With the uprising, however, the government of Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli was effectively dissolved with his resignation on September 9, 2025 as the protests began to encounter violence from the police and multiple key buildings were burned down (including but not limited to the Parliament—Singha Durbar—and the Prime Minister’s residence). From September 9, 2025 to September 12, 2025, the country was effectively under martial law as key figures scrambled to form an interim government, which was finally formed via Discord with the appointment of Sushila Karki, a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Nepal, as Prime Minister.

For the purposes of this committee, we shall begin on September 5, 2025, one day after the implementation of the social media ban and the beginning of protest organizing. Protests shall commence immediately across the nation, increasing in intensity with each passing day (barring intervention from your characters). The direction of the uprising, the actions you may take, and the way this event resolves itself shall be up to your backrooms. I am going to strive for delegate-driven crisis updates, so while history may inform your decisions, do not let it confine you. Since this event is also in a tight timeframe, I shall inform you with each crisis update what day it is, with every update roughly encompassing the events of one day or at most two. Don’t

overthink this when it comes to your backrooms, however, as I will be very flexible with getting your crisis note actions through even if the timing may be slightly unrealistic (within reason).

Also for the purposes of this committee, many figures who realistically were not in contact with one another now are together in a committee, an event that never happened; for simplicity's sake, it shall be imagined that these figures convened in a fictional summit to try to negotiate a deescalation to the crisis before it got out of hand.

As a traditional crisis, you shall have 2 notepads of one character each, with note cycles synced to directive cycles (so notes will be transferred at the end of one directive cycle and a crisis update shall be given to kickstart a new directive cycle) which shall be sub 30 minutes.

Background:

Absolute Monarchy: The Panchayat Era (1961-1990)

In December of 1960, although a democratic congress had come to power only the year prior, King Mahendra of Nepal (r. 1955-72) promptly disbanded the government, banned political parties, jailed political leaders, suspended the constitution, and established an autocratic monarchy.¹ Initially, the Nepali congress met the king's coup with violent resistance, which was managed while congress was in exile in India.² However, by the end of 1962, due to border disputes between India and China, India made the tactical decision to put its full support behind King Mahendra's government, and the Nepali army, now accustomed to fighting guerilla warfare, quelled violent action from the exiled Nepali congress.³ With the political capital to now consolidate control, in December 1962, the monarchy organized the new government into a four-tiered system called *panchayat* (assembly) that, while representative in nature, was often manipulated by King Mahendra and his successor King Birendra (r. 1972-2001) to empower loyal local elites.⁴ Indeed, the power of the king and the elites felt challenged by congress as they saw it as a mechanism for their power to degrade, especially with the entrance of radical parties like the Communist Party of Nepal.

The *panchayat* tiers worked as such, per the Library of Congress Country Studies on Nepal:⁵

At the local level, there were 4,000 village assemblies (*gaun sabha*) electing nine members of the village *panchayat*, who in turn elected a mayor (*sabhapati*). Each village

¹ Baral 1994.

² Savada 1991a.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Baral 1994.

⁵ Savada 1991a.

panchayat sent a member to sit on one of seventy-five district (*zilla*) *panchayat*, representing from forty to seventy villages; one-third of the members of these assemblies were chosen by the town *panchayat*. Members of the district *panchayat* elected representatives to fourteen zone assemblies (*anchal sabha*) functioning as electoral colleges for the National Panchayat, or Rashtriya Panchayat, in Kathmandu. In addition, there were class organizations at village, district, and zonal levels for peasants, youth, women, elders, laborers, and ex-soldiers, who elected their own representatives to assemblies. The National Panchayat of about ninety members could not criticize the royal government, debate the principles of partyless democracy, introduce budgetary bills without royal approval, or enact bills without approval of the king. Mahendra was supreme commander of the armed forces, appointed (and had the power to remove) members of the Supreme Court, appointed the Public Service Commission to oversee the civil service, and could change any judicial decision or amend the constitution at any time.

It must also be understood that the king managed to defend this system by both contending that it upheld Hindu tradition⁶ and by claiming divine authority as a spiritual force, an avatar of Vishnu upholding *dharma* in the world.⁷

Indeed, this period was marred by indirect authoritarian control, exemplified by King Birendra's Back-to-the-Village National Campaign (1975) which was only a vessel of empowering candidates loyal to the throne into the *panchayat*, and the National Independent Student Council which was only a tool to monitor the political activity of Nepali students and collapsed in 1979 due to pressure from the national student body.⁸ It was in fact due to this successful student agitation that a national referendum was brought to vote in 1979 on whether the *panchayat* system should be reformed or the status-quo ought to be maintained—the

⁶ Baral 1994.

⁷ Savada 1991a.

⁸ Savada 1991b.

status-quo won out (possibly with electoral manipulation) and remained the Nepali national political system through the 1980s.⁹

Dramatic Upheaval (1990)

Despite their losses in 1962, the Nepali Congress Party continued to be the strongest opposition to the monarchy while in exile in India, although other parties (including the Communist Party of Nepal) operated both underground in the country and in exile.¹⁰ Their efforts would come to a head, however, when economic woes, a schism with India over the renewal of trade and transit agreements, and the international collapse of authoritarian regimes globally (namely in the Eastern Bloc) led to a rapid disintegration of the *panchayat* system, constitutional reforms, and the return of liberal democracy¹¹ spearheaded by the Nepali Congress Party and the Communist Party of Nepal in 1990.¹²

Unable to contain the widespread public agitation against the *panchayat* system and the mounting casualties, and fearing for the survival of his own monarchical status, King Birendra lifted the ban on political parties on April 8. The unrest persisted. In the midst of continued violence, a royal proclamation on April 16 dissolved the Rashtriya Panchayat and invalidated provisions of the 1962 constitution inconsistent with multiparty democracy. The next day, the king named Nepali Congress Party President K.P. Bhattarai, a moderate who had spent fourteen years as a political prisoner, as prime minister and head of the interim government. The government also freed all political prisoners, lifted control of all domestic and foreign publications, and established a commission, known as the Mullick Commission, to investigate the recent loss of life and property.

⁹ Baral 1994.

¹⁰ Savada 1991b.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Baral 1994.

...

After nine months of politicking, the constitution was proclaimed on November 9, 1990. Elections to the House of Representatives were held on May 12, 1991. The new government faced the immediate problems of restoring law and order, providing economic relief to the populace, and establishing its claim to sound administration, a somewhat difficult task because the parties of the interim government had been in the opposition for a long period of time.¹³

Already, echoes of the 2025 uprising can be seen in 1990, with public agitation over an authoritarian government spilling into dramatic upheaval resulting in comprehensive liberal reforms (with unrest not ceasing with basic reforms, like reinstating political parties or lifting the social media ban, but only with systemic revolution). The upheaval of 1990, however, still led to the authoritarianism that was at issue in 2025; whether this revolution may be doomed to fail in the same way is a frightening possibility feared by some analysts and even Hami Nepal representatives.

Rise of the Communist Parties of Nepal

Nepal is not a communist country per se and has a complicated history in this regard. Unlike quintessential communist countries that dominate Western discourse—the People’s Republic of China, the USSR, Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea etc.—Nepali communism was (1) defined not by the dominance of one party but a diverse mix of communist parties of differing ideologies which often collaborated, merged, and split with one another, (2) communism in Nepal only gained popularity *after* the Cold War, and (3) the parties participated in the parliamentary system like any other party (but unlike parties like the British Communist Party, they were actually able to gain enough seats to rule). Thus, Nepali politics vis-à-vis communism

¹³ Savada 1991b.

must be understood within this unique context and not lumped together with other communist projects.¹⁴

Nepal has been ruled since approximately 2008 by an evershifting coalition of communist parties (many of the same name, “The Communist Party of Nepal”, so abbreviations like “M”, for Maoist, following the name are used to distinguish parties by their ideological affiliations; frankly, diving into all these parties shall be avoided here, it is genuinely one of the most confusing topics to read about and only a cursory understanding should suffice). However, it was the Communist Party of Nepal (M)—formed in 1994 by Pushpa Kamal Dahal—that became the vanguard for a decade of anti-monarchical guerilla violence between 1996 and 2006 that resulted in the deaths of around 12,000 Nepali civilians.¹⁵ The party gained strong footholds in the villages and successfully disseminated Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine among the peasantry, a strategy known as the “Prachanda Path”, named after Dahal’s nickname “Prachanda”, meaning “fierce”.¹⁶ By 2005, the party felt it had gained enough leverage to offer a peace deal alongside other mainstream parties to King Gyanendra (r. 2001-2008) requesting the abolition of the monarchy.¹⁷ But Gyanendra refused and in turn dissolved parliament in February of 2005, a move which sent the public into a mass mobilization effort that resulted in a United Nations-brokered peace treaty that promised free and fair parliamentary elections.¹⁸ These elections led to the CPN (M) winning a plurality of the seats, Dahal coming to power as prime minister, and the parliament’s first action being the prompt dissolution of the monarchy,

¹⁴ Moreover, while the CPN (UML) was in power during the uprising, the protestors did not restrict their criticism solely to the CPN (UML) nor other communist parties, criticism was also levied at the more centrist Nepali Congress Party and RSP. The protestors’ gripes were almost certainly with the establishment writ large.

¹⁵ Gupta 2025. It should also be noted that the Maoist insurgency was charged at the time for various human rights violations, including the alleged use of child soldiers.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

officially ending the Shah dynasty in Nepal,¹⁹ although monarchists do remain (like the Rastriya Prajatantra Party led by Rajendra Lingden²⁰).

Directly Preceding the 2025 Revolution

In 2024, Dahal had fallen to be only the opposition leader in the government after failing to gain the confidence of parliament as prime minister, while the CPN (Unified Marxist-Leninist)—a moderate communist party that emerged in 1991—regained power under its chairman, and now prime minister, KP Sharma Oli.²¹ This was Oli's third time in office, a situation endemic of the rotating door of establishment prime ministers in Nepal.

For reference, the distribution of seats in 2025 was thus after the last elections in 2022.²² After the no-confidence vote against Prachanda, the new ruling coalition included only the


¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Joshi 2021.

²¹ *The Kathmandu Post* 2024.

²² Ghimire 2022. Note that this article was made when Dahal's ruling coalition was expected to be in power, although the distribution of seats remained unchanged from 2022 to 2025. The image is also from this article.

Nepali Congress and the CPN (UML) under the prime ministry of KP Sharma Oli:



THE KATHMANDU POST

Total seats won by parties. Post Graphics

Preceding this term, faith in the Nepali government was already plummeting as citizens charged it with corruption, a lack of transparency, and frequent scandals, especially during the pandemic.²³ Exposure of this corruption often manifested in the protestors' use of the tag #NepoKids on social media video exposés of the lavish lifestyles led by many government officials and their families, an online trend also practiced by Gen Z protestors across South East Asia.²⁴

But the Oli administration truly lit the fuse to these explosive tensions when—on September 4, 2025—the government banned the operations of two dozen social media platforms (including Facebook, Youtube, Discord, and X; some platforms like TikTok were allowed to

²³ Sharma 2021.

²⁴ NDTV 2025.

continue operations) for non-compliance with a mandated registration system designed to restrict the proliferation of “misinformation.”²⁵ This move, immediately panned as authoritarian in nature, became the catalyst for the following protests.²⁶

The Historical Progression of the Uprising

By now, we are past the starting point of this committee. The following events do not necessarily hold any weight in terms of the actions that you as delegates may take. Nevertheless, this rough timeline is here for your information and for reference.²⁷

September 4th - The controversial social media ban is officially enacted by the Oli administration after most social media companies failed to meet the August 28th deadline for registration with the government.

September 5th through 7th - Sporadic protests begin across Nepal, organizers on social media use VPNs to circumvent the ban, although no major confrontations begin at this time.

Morning of September 8th - Thousands of protestors gather en masse at Maitighar Mandala in central Kathmandu and march toward the Federal Parliament—located in the Singha Durbar complex. Protestors broke through police barricades at around 11:38 AM and security forces began deploying water cannons and tear gas in response, but could not stop the march and protestors scaled the main gates of Singha Durbar by noon. The protests were composed of an eclectic mix of groups, but were primarily spearheaded by Gen-Z youth and students.

12:30 PM on September 8th - The Kathmandu District Administration Office imposes a curfew but most protestors do not hear about it. By 12:37 PM, police open fire on protestors scaling the Parliament gates.

²⁵ Gurubacharya 2025.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ This timeline is based upon that which was provided by Suwal 2025.

Afternoon of September 8th - The protestors maintain constant pressure on the compound including by scaling the on-site police outpost, a journalist is shot by police while reporting, and several vehicles catch fire. Injured protestors begin to be transported to the Civil Service Hospital while police fire tear gas inside the Parliament compound.

Evening of September 8th - Prime Minister Oli would convene an emergency cabinet session as official death tolls would reach 19 fatalities and at least 100 injuries. The Home Minister would resign and the Communications Minister would announce the lifting of the social media ban. Curfews would be expanded to most districts and federal buildings; the army would be kept on standby.

Morning of September 9th - The Health and Agriculture Ministers would resign, ex Chief Justice Sushila Karki would visit injured protestors in the Civil Service Hospital, and new protests would erupt in spite of curfews and the lifting of the social media ban. The residence of the former Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba would be set on fire and the offices of the Nepali Congress Party and CPN (UML) would be set ablaze. Before noon, several members of the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) would announce their collective resignations.

Afternoon of September 9th - The private residence of Prime Minister Oli, the office of the Department of Transport Management, the Hilton Hotel of Kathmandu, and several other buildings would be torched.

Conclusion of September 9th - In the late afternoon, Prime Minister Oli would formally resign and security officials would publicly state that they had no authorization to open fire on protestors even if governmental buildings were attacked. Fires spread to the Supreme Court, the Maoist Party headquarters, lower courthouses, Singha Durbar, and the President's residence at

Shital Niwas. Over 13,000 inmates escape from prisons across the country amidst the chaos, 3,000 alone from the Central Jail Sundhara.

September 10th - Following the Prime Minister's resignation, the Army and the President would largely take up executive authority, including by maintaining curfew restrictions and with Chief of the Army Staff Ashok Raj Sigdel inviting key protest leaders for dialogue as the protestors' platform came to be represented by Hami Nepal and the Nepal Gen-Z Front—that of holding new parliamentary elections, ensuring the proper end of the social media ban, and entering into procedure to choose a new Prime Minister. Controversially, monarchist activist Durga Prasai and his cohort within the RPP were also invited, to the dismay of the more progressive leaders in Hami Nepal and the Nepal Gen-Z Front. Nevertheless, dialogue would be kept open and intense internal debate would ensue, primarily within Hami Nepal channels, over the future of the Nepali government.

September 12th - Following 2 days of intense debate, primarily through Hami Nepal's "Youth Against Corruption" Discord server, five names came to make up a final poll to decide who would be the interim Prime Minister: Harka Sampang, a social activist and mayor of Dharan; Mahabir Pun, a popular social entrepreneur and activist running the National Innovation Centre; Sagar Dhakal, an independent youth leader; advocate Rastra Bimochan Timalina (known as Random Nepali on YouTube); and former Chief Justice Sushila Karki (mayor of Kathmandu Balen Shah was also a popular candidate but withdrew his candidacy in favor of endorsing Karki). Sushila Karki would win the vote with 50 percent approval (3,833 votes out of 7,713 total). The poll did not elect Karki per se, rather it guided President Ram Chandra Poudel's decision to appoint Karki as the interim Prime Minister under Article 61(4) of the Constitution. Debates primarily stalled over whether Parliament should be dissolved as well as frustrations

over perceived delays in the process; nevertheless, upon Karki's recommendation, President Poudel would dissolve Parliament and set elections for March 5, 2026.

End of September - Death tolls were confirmed to be at least 75 dead and over 2,000 injured. Many question the Karki administration for its constitutionality, both in Karki's own appointment as Prime Minister (a prima facie violation of Article 132(2) which bars Chief Justices and other high officials from becoming Prime Minister) and in how she has appointed her cabinet members. Nevertheless, due to her position only being for the interim and with the extraordinary circumstances in mind, some constitutional scholars have maintained support for Karki. Moreover, the exact extent of all human rights violations over the course of the revolution remains to be fully quantified and reported.

Questions to Consider:

1. The protests lack a clear sense of leadership, direction, and a platform aside from being opposed to the current government, to corruption writ large, and to the social media ban. What should be the platform for the revolution? What would be the best future for Nepal? How does any new government avoid repeating the cycle of liberal reform to eventual authoritarianism that has seemingly defined 20th-21st century Nepali history?
2. Are the protests justified? Should the goals of the uprising be pursued through more temperate political reform or radical upheaval? Is *violent* protest justified? If not, what should be the response to violent protest? What should be the response to any violent *counter* protest measures by the government?
3. Should the government be reformed? To what extent should the political paradigm of Nepal be changed? Is it satisfactory if the social media ban is lifted but politics returns to the status quo? If a new government is formed, what should it look like and how should it function? How is it assured that this government will not be corrupt? Can and should the old guard of the political parties be expelled?

Character List:

To reiterate, for the purposes of this committee, many figures who realistically were not in contact with one another now are together in a committee, an event that never happened. For simplicity's sake, it shall be imagined that these figures convened in a fictional summit to try to negotiate a deescalation to the crisis. This committee starts on September 5, 2025, one day following the social media ban.

Current Government**Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli**

Widely unpopular for the social media ban enacted by his government, the Prime Minister is on the hot seat to end the protests swiftly and reassert control over Nepal lest his administration collapses. This endeavor shall surely require navigating the complexities of Nepali communist politics and maintaining the party alliances, especially with the moderate Nepali Congress Party, keeping the ruling coalition alive. As an older establishment politician, Oli has a plethora of connections to leverage as well as the powers of the Prime Ministership, at the cost of being the principal target of all critique.

President Ram Chandra Poudel

President since 2023, Ram Chandra Poudel has been a moderate backbone to the communist ruling coalitions, having been a democratic socialist as a member of the Nepali Congress Party for most of his career. A principled and poised leader, Poudel imposes a strong ethical code upon himself by, for instance, cutting all party ties when he ascended to the Presidency to avoid conflicts of interest, by spending 15 years total in prison as an objector to the *panchayat* system, and by having been a protester against the absolute monarchy. While this background may

appeal to many, Poudel is by far the oldest member of government at 81. The President, a predominantly ceremonial role, does hold certain capabilities, including potential emergency authority and appointment powers, but executive authority is typically deferred to the Prime Minister.

Minister of Defence Manbir Rai

As Minister of Defence, it falls upon Manbir Rai to reassert stability over the protests, ensuring the security of Nepali officials and civilians alike. The Minister of Defense may recommend army mobilization and defensive strategies but it would require collaboration with the Chief of the Army Staff, the Prime Minister, and the President to ensure their successful implementation. Nevertheless, Rai is the Prime Minister's chief advisor in times of emergency and shall be a critical voice in the establishment of the government's counterprotest measures.

Chief of the Army Staff Ashok Raj Sigdel

The Chief of the Army Staff is the principal authority over the Nepali Army. While the Chief does not hold the authority to mobilize the army, Sigdel does have discretion over how it operates once mobilized. Should the protests grow too chaotic, the army almost certainly shall become involved in the pursuit of restoring order, and should martial law be declared, Sigdel would become one of the de facto chief executives of the nation.

Vice President Ram Sahaya Yadav

A highly educated moderate socialist, Ram Sahaya Yadav stands as the Vice President of Nepal, a position in of itself with little executive authority. Nevertheless, Yadav is a younger (age 54), yet experienced, politician and a key advisor to President Poudel. With an aging president and overall cabinet, Yadav has the potential to leverage himself as a more desirable, progressive face of the government to the protesters while being a key player in the president's executive actions.

**Chairperson of the Communist Party of Nepal and Leader of the Opposition,
Pushpa “Prachanda” Kamal Dahal**

As one of the most experienced and influential communist politicians in Nepal, Dahal holds great influence over parliament and the communist parties as a whole. However, Dahal is in an odd position, being both part of the establishment criticized by the protesters and separate from it. He may hold key influence over the political machine of Nepal, but must surely walk a tightrope of balancing change with political tradition, advising the protestors to work within the democratic framework while he tries to gain political capital at the detriment of the ruling coalition.

Chief of the Armed Police Force Raju Aryal

Lower in the ranks of the government, Aryal nevertheless stands as the direct commander on the front lines of the initial government response to the uprising. Tasked with defending the capital city from any potential violence and, under the shroud of the chaos and tumult, is expected to have significant leeway in on-the-ground decision-making. Nevertheless, he must walk a fine line lest he overstep the authority of the Armed Forces (who are also handling the protests) and the central government.

Protest Leaders/Organizers

CEO of Hami Nepal Sudan Gurung

Hami Nepal is the key non-governmental organization working to organize Nepal’s protests for the sake of democratic aims. As CEO, Sudan Gurung holds great say over the coordination, messaging, planning, and execution of the protests. Similar to the prime minister, while holding supreme executive authority within his role, Gurung also stands at great peril to face criticism

should the protests be ineffectual. Moreover, the behavior of the protests appears to be largely uncoordinated and decentralized; trying to bring cohesion and leadership to the movement shall be Gurung's core objective.

Hami Nepal Discord Moderator Sashwot Lamichhane

Although a Discord moderator, Lamichhane acts as the movement's de facto communications officer, ensuring the security of the movement (via VPN as Discord is currently part of the social media ban) while also being privy to all messages within the "Youth Against Corruption" server of over 145,000 members. Streamlined communication and therefore organization of the movement rests in part upon Lamichhane and should any key protest actions be taken on Discord, Sashwot would be the chief operator for these projects, ensuring their security from potential government surveillance and their smooth execution.

Youth Activist Rakshya Bam

Affiliated with the Nepal Gen-Z Front as opposed to Hami Nepal, Rakshya Bam stands as one of the key organizers of the movement. Charismatic, principled, and with a clear platform, Bam advocates for women's rights, marginalized communities, and greater accountability for public officials. Highly progressive, Bam is less keen on working with conservative and Hindu nationalist factions of the movement, striving to provide the uprising with both leadership and ideological purity such that she will remain bent on a continual revolution until her goals are met.

Hami Nepal Protest Organizer Anil Baniya

Baniya is a key on-the-ground organizer for Hami Nepal and while Gurung may direct organizing efforts, it will be dependent upon the work of organizers like Baniya as to whether such efforts come to fruition. A staunch advocate for peaceful protest, Anil will attempt to keep

the movement as such, fearing that violent action could result from external forces and clandestine agitators from outside Hami Nepal.

Social Activist Suman Sayami

A former candidate for Mayor of Kathmandu, rival to the current Mayor Balen Shah, and a public face of the center-left Rastriya Mukti Party (which is critical of Capitalism and Marxism), Sayami attempted to lead a peaceful nationwide campaign to gain influence for his party just prior to the 2025 uprising. With his campaign disrupted, Sayami shall try to position himself, his party, and its ideology as a framework for Gen Z protestors to rally around. Thus, the activist will attempt to catch the decentralized momentum of the Gen Z uprising, like lightning in a bottle, and ride it to political success, lest his nationwide campaign gets drowned out in the noise.

Monarchist Activist Durga Prasai

A political firebrand, Prasai is a notable businessman, investor, and a former Maoist guerrilla during the Nepali Civil War, until he flipped to become a right-wing activist petitioning for the return of the constitutional monarchy since 2023. Prasai's wealth and connections to the communist parties once led him to a luncheon with both Dahal and Oli in 2017 in which he helped negotiate an alliance between the two that resulted in a successful ruling coalition, but has since been expelled from the communist parties due to his pro-monarchy remarks made in 2023. Since then, Prasai has helped mobilize monarchists to be a small, but vocal, faction of the anti-government dissidents, but has faced scandal before due to loan defaults and running an unaffiliated medical college.

Singer Eleena Chauhan

One of the most well-recognized young pop artists in Nepal, Eleena Chauhan has carved a niche for herself in blending new wave pop with traditional Nepali folk influences. Her large fan base

and social media presence make her a highly influential backer to the protests, for which she has quickly pledged her support. However, whether her brand and her message can get across to other generations and to those actually holding the levers of power remains to be seen.

Prominent Figures

***Note that these following characters, while prominent, are not necessarily aligned with one side or another, many have complicated ties to both the protestors and the current government. At the point in which this committee takes place, their roles in the ensuing revolution are still up in the air, and should be treated as such.

Ex Chief Justice of Nepal Sushila Karki

From 2016-2017, Karki served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Nepal and had served on the high court since 2009. In her time, she had been the first female Justice in Nepal, became widely known for her political neutrality as an unaligned independent, and would be praised by many for her staunch anti-corruption stances and rulings. But she would become seen as an enemy of the government following the Supreme Court's overturning of the appointment of the Chief of Nepal Police in 2017 such that the Nepali Congress Party and the CPN (M) would initiate successful impeachment proceedings against her and her term would conclude later that year. Now, her experience, fame as an opponent of corruption, and her political neutrality have made her an appealing figure to protestors who see her as a potential leader for the movement while the government sees her as a potential ally to reassert establishment norms through a neutral, non-radical platform that could defuse the more radical elements of the uprising.

Ex Deputy Prime Minister (Imprisoned) Rabi Lamichhane

Lamichhane's long and convoluted career began in communications as a broadcaster and journalist at *News24* which brought him to great popularity and remained a prominent feature of his identity. In 2022, Lamichhane would become President of the centrist Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) and would become a member of Parliament that year, quickly being appointed Deputy Prime Minister as well. However, his career would be marred by scandals and he would twice be stripped of his position as Deputy Prime Minister, with the most recent time being in April, 2025 after he was successfully convicted of financial embezzlement. He is, as of the time of this committee, imprisoned in Nakkhu Prison. Nevertheless, Lamichhane remains incredibly popular, throngs of protesters gather outside Nakkhu Prison advocating for his release, and under his leadership the RSP helped lead ruling coalitions with Pushpa Kamal Dahal's CPN (M) and K.P. Sharma Oli's CPN (UML). A true wildcard, this political dynamo could secure a place on either side of the uprising, even from the cells of Nakkhu.

Former King of Nepal Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev

The last King of Nepal until the abolition of the monarchy, Gyanendra succeeded his brother Birendra following the latter's assassination by Crown Prince Dipendra in 2001. In his short reign, Gyanendra strayed from his brother's moderatism regarding the constitutional monarchy in favor of greater executive authority for the throne, ending with Gyanendra renouncing the throne in disgrace. Now, the king is backed by a loyal political body of monarchists who maintain that the rule of the Shah Dynasty was preferable (mainly due to Hindu nationalist sentiments) to the current state of Nepal. Despite having no political authority any longer, the king has great wealth, contends that he is still legally the king of Nepal, and could certainly regain influence in the present crisis, but many hurdles remain in place before that comes to

fruition, chief among them whether young protestors want to support an autocrat from before their time.

Mayor of Kathmandu Balen Shah

A member of the centrist RSP, Shah has been Mayor of Kathmandu since 2022 after defeating the Nepali Congress Party and CPN (UML) candidates. Shah first gained moderate prominence as a hip-hop artist in 2013 after he was featured on the *Youtube* rap battle channel *Raw Barz* and rode that popularity to grow his career since. During his term as Mayor, Shah has drawn controversy for his heavy-handed use of executive authority in endeavors such as the beautification of the city, for clashing with federal authorities (like the Civil Aviation Authority), for being an adamant Nepali irredentist, and for authorizing force against street vendors. As the Mayor of Nepal's capital city, Shah shall be expected to directly address the brunt of some of the largest protests in the country, and likely shall do so independently of the ruling government's wishes.

Managing Director of the Nepal Electrical Authority Kulman Ghising

In his second term as the Managing Director of the NEA, a deceptively modest position, Ghising has risen to great prominence for successfully eliminating load-shedding (which entailed power cuts to Nepal's major cities) by ending 24-hour uninterrupted power supplies to major industries, overhauling Nepal's hydropower stations, and bringing back online previously defunct power plants. After only 2 years into his first term, load-shedding was eliminated in both residential and industrial sectors. Simply put, under his leadership, almost all of Nepal gained access to 24-hour uninterrupted electricity and this effort did not go unrecognized as he became one of Nepal's most popular bureaucrats, to the point where his unexpected removal from office in 2020 spurred widespread protests in his favor which got him reappointed in 2021. Ghising's strong political

record, effective management, and opposition to the establishment in favor of policies beneficial to the broader Nepali populace make him a top candidate to give direction to the Gen Z movement or help the current government reform.

Chairman of the Rastriya Prajatantra Party Rajendra Lingden

Lingden leads Nepal's foremost monarchist and Hindu-nationalist party in the RPP. His party, under his leadership, has attempted to bring the return of the monarchy to referendum, has led multiple national campaigns (often in coordination with Durga Prasai), and rebuked the ruling coalition in the 2022 elections with an upset by winning 14 seats in parliament, a margin albeit small but more than ever expected. Indeed, in the 2017 and 2022 elections, Lingden himself defeated one of the top Nepali Congress Party candidates to win his seat. Now, Lingden looks to help lead the monarchists in the uprising by positioning the past as the future and return Nepal to a constitutional monarchy and Hindu state.

Social Entrepreneur in the Nepal Wireless Networking Project Mahabir Pun

Mahabir Pun, through relentless nonprofit work, successfully brought wireless internet to even the remotest parts of Nepal. A former computer teacher, Pun began by imploring the *BBC* to ask the international community on his behalf how he could best achieve internet and phone connections in the Himalayas. The international community responded with crowd funding, grants, and designs in 2001, and Pun would soon successfully establish relay stations with handmade antennae and TV satellite dishes, bringing the internet even to the tallest mountains on the planet. Indeed, Pun would rise to prominence for this action, even being inducted into the Internet Hall of Fame. He would continue his efforts by establishing the National Innovation Center in Nepal, a foundation that provides grants and crowdsourced funds for research and development projects. As a political outsider and staunch advocate for the public good, Pun is an

icon to many, and, as a fighter for internet freedom, directly positioned against the social media ban while being critical of any violent approaches the protesters may take, advocating instead for targeted political reform.

Ex Supreme Court Justice Anil Kumar Sinha

A Justice of the Supreme Court of Nepal from 2016-2023, Sinha served briefly with Sushila Karki and ruled on many landmark cases during his tenure. Well versed in law, particularly business and tax law, Sinha will likely figure to be a critical player in the development of any new legislation and legal codes established in the wake of the uprising. He has clashed with the government before, including during the two instances when KP Sharma Oli dissolved parliament unconstitutionally as well as during the scandal of the Lalita Niwas Land Scam which featured fraud by prominent government officials. Thus, Sinha will be a key figure to properly draft any legal reforms and his expertise is a desirable asset to both sides of the uprising.

Supreme Court Advocate Om Prakash Aryal

As a Supreme Court Advocate, Aryal argues cases before the Supreme Court of Nepal and has featured prominently in some of the high court's most controversial cases. During the Maoist insurgency, for instance, Aryal challenged the government's handling of the matter by filing habeas corpus petitions to ensure that alleged rebels were lawfully detained. Moreover, he challenged state benefits that former *panchayat* rulers received following the dissolution of the system, although these challenges all failed. Indeed, he also worked with the National Human Rights Commission to monitor human rights abuses during the absolute monarchy of 2006. His intervention during that time helped bring evidence of government brutality against an official, Lokman Singh Karki, when the latter was appointed in 2013 to the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA), in turn successfully blocking the appointment. A

fierce opponent of government brutality and corruption, Aryal can provide legal support and will advocate for the rights of protesters during the present crisis but only on the grounds that the protests remain lawful and peaceful.

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